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During the past thirty years, clinical legal education has 
become an important component of most law school curricula.  In 
clinics, students, typically in their second or third year of law 
school, represent clients in actual cases in a legal aid office at the 
law school, pursuant to a court approved “student practice order.”1  
Under the supervision of faculty members, students interview and 
counsel clients, investigate facts, research legal rules, negotiate with 
opposing parties, draft documents, and try and argue cases in 
court.  Proponents of clinical education have urged the 
development and expansion of clinical programs to train students 
in the skills necessary to apply legal doctrine in practice.2  While 
few have argued that the traditional law school curriculum be 
replaced with an entirely clinical curriculum, many have suggested 
the introduction of courses using clinical methods during the first 
year and increased clinical offerings in the last two years.3  Just 
recently, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching published a major study of legal education lauding 
clinical education as one of “the law school’s primary means of 
teaching students how to connect the abstract thinking formed by 
legal categories and procedures with fuller human contexts.”4  And 
in the recent report, Best Practices for Legal Education, which 
professes to present a vision and road map for legal education, the 
authors argue that contextualized learning, such as clinical 
training, is the most effective and efficient way for students to 
develop professional competence.5 
While the proponents of clinical education identify a number 
of virtues for this pedagogy,6 much of the literature on the subject 
 1. See Peter A. Joy & Robert R. Kuehn, Conflict of Interest and Competency Issues 
in Law Clinic Practice, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 493, 497 (2002). 
 2. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION 
FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 115 (2007). 
 3. See, e.g., ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 151 
(2007); Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical Education for 
this Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 41–44 (2000); Kate O'Neill, 
Adding an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Perspective to a Traditional Legal Writing 
Course, 50 FLA. L. REV. 709 (1998); Franklin M. Schultz, Teaching "Lawyering" to 
First-Year Law Students: An Experiment in Constructing Legal Competence, 52 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1643 (1995). 
 4. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 58. 
 5. STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 144. 
 6. See generally Report of the Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 511, 512–517 (1992) [hereinafter Report on the Future of the In-House 
Clinic]  (identifying nine purposes of clinical legal education: (1) developing 
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focuses on one major benefit: teaching modes of planning and 
analysis for problem solving in unstructured situations.7  Advocates 
of clinical education argue that traditional legal education has 
focused too narrowly on legal rules and doctrinal analysis.  In his 
seminal article on the purposes of clinical legal education, Anthony 
Amsterdam complained that traditional legal education taught 
students only three kinds of analytic thinking: case reading and 
interpretation; doctrinal analysis and application; and logical 
conceptualization and criticism, while ignoring other modes of 
analysis that are essential for the practice of law.8  These neglected 
modes of analysis include: (1) ends-means thinking; (2) hypothesis 
formulation and testing in information acquisition; and (3) 
decision making in situations where options involve differing and 
often uncertain degrees of risk and promises of different sorts.9 
Proponents of this pedagogy assert that clinical courses 
address this deficiency by teaching students how to solve problems 
in practice.  As a committee report of the Clinical Legal Education 
Section of the American Association of Law Schools asserted: 
The clinic is an ideal vehicle for imparting [the skills of 
ends-means thinking and applying doctrine to situations 
where the facts are unclear or developing].  First, the 
problems presented to students have all the difficulty, 
texture, and chance that occur in the world of practice.  
Students must consider this range of issues while problem 
solving.  Second, the in-house clinic possesses the 
resources to develop these skills.  Many clinical teachers 
who convey these skills begin with lecture and simulation 
discussing problem-solving models.  Most then follow with 
intensive discussion during student supervision.  While 
time-consuming, that individual supervision is a powerful 
modes of planning and analysis for dealing with unstructured situations; (2) 
providing professional skills instruction; (3) teaching means of learning from 
experience; (4) instructing students in professional responsibility; (5) exposing 
students to the demands and methods of acting in role; (6) providing 
opportunities for collaborative learning; (7) imparting the obligation for service to 
indigent clients; (8) providing the opportunity for examining the impact of 
doctrine in real life and providing a laboratory in which students and faculty study 
particular areas of the law; and (9) critiquing the capacities and limitations of 
lawyers and the legal system). 
 7. See, e.g., SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 95–100; Anthony G. Amsterdam, 
Clinical Legal Education—A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612, 614–15 
(1984); Report on the Future of the In-House Clinic, supra note 6, at 512. 
 8. Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 613. 
 9. Id. at 614–15. 
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means to focus student attention on these skills.10 
In a similar vein, one commentator asserts that, “[w]ithout 
undermining the importance of other forms of learning, clinical 
education stands squarely for the proposition that students learn 
most effectively by participating in their own education by actually 
representing people.”11  Another prominent figure in the clinical 
movement observes that “[s]tudents need to experience the 
demands, constraints, and methods of analyzing and dealing with 
unstructured situations in which the issues have not been identified 
in advance.  Otherwise, their problem-solving skills cannot 
mature.”12  The Best Practices for Legal Education report notes that 
“one of the strengths of experiential education is that it gives 
students opportunities to practice solving problems and to receive 
feedback on the quality of their efforts.”13  Indeed, the Carnegie 
Report finds that “[s]tudents cannot become effective problem-
solvers unless they have opportunities to engage in problem-solving 
activities in hypothetical or real legal contexts.”14 
Despite the extensive literature identifying these lofty goals for 
clinical legal education, very little empirical work has been 
conducted of the actual effects of such training on students’ 
abilities to solve actual problems and learn from experience.15  
Most of this scholarship is based solely on the anecdotal 
experiences of the authors or informal surveys of students in 
clinical courses.16  For example, the recent Carnegie Report on 
 10. Report on the Future of the In-House Clinic, supra note 6, at 512. 
 11. William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teaching for the New Clinical Law 
Professor: A View from the First Floor, 28 AKRON L. REV. 463, 475 (1995). 
 12. Roy T. Stuckey, Preparing Students to Practice Law: A Global Problem in Need of 
Global Solutions, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 649, 670 (2002). 
 13. STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 3, at 170. 
 14. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 95 (while purportedly quoting ROY 
STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP 
109 (2007), such a quotation is not contained in the published copy of that 
report). 
 15. See James R.P. Ogloff et al., More Than “Learning to Think Like a Lawyer:” 
The Empirical Research of Legal Education, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 73, 184–86 (2000). 
 16. See, e.g., Mark Neal Aaronson, We Ask You to Consider: Learning About 
Practical Judgment in Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 247 (1998); Donald L. Alderman 
et al., The Validity of Written Simulation Exercises for Assessing Clinical Skills in Legal 
Education, 41 EDUC. AND PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 1115 (1981); Brook K. Baker, 
Learning to Fish, Fishing to Learn: Guided Participation in the Interpersonal Ecology of 
Practice, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (1999); Katherine R. Kruse, Biting Off What They Can 
Chew: Strategies for Involving Students in Problem-Solving Beyond Individual Client 
Representation, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 405 (2002); Andrea M. Seieslstad, Community 
Building as a Means of Teaching Creative, Cooperative, and Complex Problem Solving in 
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legal education makes broad claims about the benefits of clinical 
and other experiential education.17  The report states that clinical 
training is the “law school’s primary means of teaching students 
how to connect the abstract thinking formed by legal categories 
and procedures with fuller human context;”18 that “responsibility of 
clients and accountability for one’s actions are at the center of 
clinical experience;”19 and that “context-based education is the 
most effective setting in which to develop professional knowledge 
and skills.”20  The report primarily bases these assertions, however, 
on informal surveys of clinical programs at different law schools.21  
While field research is an accepted form of qualitative empirical 
research, adequate methodological controls are necessary to assure 
valid and reliable findings.22  Without such controls, studies such as 
the Carnegie Report and Best Practices report provide only limited 
assistance for an assessment of whether or not clinical education 
achieves its goals. 
Precisely because of this deficiency in the literature on clinical 
education, I have attempted to begin some empirical research on 
the subject.  For the past five years I have been working with Vimla 
Patel and her colleagues on developing research projects on legal 
education and the profession.  Patel, for the past two-and-a-half 
decades, has been conducting empirical research on medical 
Clinical Legal Education, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 445 (2002).  While one empirical study 
compared skills in client interviewing between students with and without clinical 
experience, it did not focus on the issue of the impact of clinical education on its 
principal pedagogical goal: enhancing students’ abilities to solve actual problems 
and learn from experience.  See Donald L. Alderman et al., The Validity of Written 
Simulation Exercises for Assessing Clinical Skills in Legal Education, 41 EDUC. AND 
PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 1115 (1981). 
 17. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 58, 121, 125. 
 18. Id. at 58. 
 19. Id. at 121. 
 20. Id. at 125 (affirming a conclusion made in the Best Practices for Legal 
Education Report). 
 21. In its discussion of development of professional expertise, besides relying 
on informal surveys, the report also bases its recommendations on theories 
developed by philosopher Hubert Dreyfus and engineer Stuart Dreyfus.  Id. at 
116–18.  Those theories, however, are hotly contested in the cognitive science 
community, see Vimla L. Patel, Steering Through the Murky Waters of Scientific Conflict: 
Situated and Symbolic Models of Clinical Cognition, 7 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN 
MEDICINE 413 (1995), a point that  is not acknowledged by the authors of the 
Report. 
 22. See generally Richard K. Neumann, Jr. & Stefan H. Krieger, Empirical Inquiry 
Twenty-Five Years After The Lawyering Process, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 349, 375 (2003) 
(observing that for rigorous survey research, the hypothesis must be identified 
precisely, and rival hypotheses must be identified and tested as well). 
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education focusing particularly on the issue of teaching problem-
solving methods to medical students.  One of her areas of study has 
been the comparison of traditional medical curricula with problem-
based learning (PBL), which places a strong emphasis on learning 
in the context of solving and understanding authentic patient 
problems.23 
While Patel has recognized some benefits of PBL curricula, she 
has cautioned against the bandwagon acceptance of PBL in 
medical education because of the lack of rigorous empirical 
assessment of the approach.24  As she has written, “[a]s is often the 
case in education, with problem-based learning, innovations in 
practice outstripped theoretical justifications or empirical research 
demonstrating the validity of the new approach.”25  For this same 
reason, given the paucity of rigorous empirical research on clinical 
legal education, more rigorous study of this pedagogy is necessary 
to supplement the anecdotes and tributes from teachers in the 
field. 
To that end, I have collaborated with Patel and her colleagues 
in replicating some of their studies of medical education in the 
domain of legal education.  I initially conducted a study on the 
development of legal reasoning in law students from first year 
through graduation.26  As a follow-up to this study, in consultation 
with Patel and one of her colleagues, I have conducted a study of 
the effect of clinical education on legal reasoning.  This article 
presents the methodology and findings of this study.  This article 
will first describe the previous study of the development of legal 
reasoning in law students throughout law school.  It will then 
identify the hypotheses of the present study of the effect of clinical 
legal education on student reasoning and discuss the methodology 
of this research.  Next, it will present the findings of the study and 
relate them to the conclusions of the initial research.  Finally, it will 
suggest areas for future research on this subject. 
 23. “The problems stimulate the students to acquire all pertinent knowledge, 
including the basic scientific information necessary to understand the underlying 
mechanisms of health and disease.”  Vimla L. Patel & David R. Kaufman, Medical 
Education Isn’t Just About Solving Problems, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 2, 2001, at 
B12.  For a fuller description of the differences between traditional and PBL 
medical curricula, see generally Stefan H. Krieger, Domain Knowledge and the 
Teaching of Creative Problem Solving, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 149, 178–79 (2004). 
 24. Patel & Kaufman, supra note 23, at B12. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Stefan H. Krieger, The Development of Legal Reasoning Skills in Law Students: 
An Empirical Study, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 332 (2006). 
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As with the first study, a disclaimer is required at the outset.  
Findings of an individual study have only limited significance, 
especially given the small sample size of this one and the fact that 
the subjects were from a single law school and clinical program.  
The purpose of this study, however, is not to provide definitive 
conclusions on the effects of clinical education, but to lay the 
groundwork for future research in the area.  Hopefully, others will 
review the data of this study, replicate it, fine tune it, and build on 
its findings.  By using methodological controls which have not been 
used in most previous scholarship on clinical education, this 
research offers an alternative to informal surveys and anecdotes for 
assessing clinical education. 
I. PRIOR STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING IN LAW STUDENTS 
The purpose of our initial study was to explore the 
development of legal-reasoning skills in law students throughout 
their law school careers.  Cognitive scientists theorize that experts 
develop schemas to solve problems—-“ordered patterns of mental 
representations that encapsulate all our knowledge regarding 
specific objects, concepts or events.”27  Developed from repeated 
encounters with similar experiences, “[a] schema can be viewed as 
a coded expectation about any aspect of an individual’s life, which 
dictates which characteristics of a given event are attended to, 
which are stored for the future and which are rejected as 
irrelevant.”28  In other words, they are mental blueprints we carry 
around in our heads for quick assessments of what we think should 
be happening in a particular situation.  In regard to the 
development of expertise, researchers theorize that as a result of 
greater experience in a particular domain, experts use their well-
developed schemas to filter out reflexively irrelevant data and focus 
on relevant information to come to a solution.  Novices have not 
yet developed such schema systems and instead solve problems by 
testing multiple hypotheses before developing a solution.29  In our 
research, modeled after a Patel study of medical students,30 we 
sought to examine whether law students, by the end of their 
education, had begun to develop some of the reasoning strategies 
 27. See Mark P. Higgins & Mary P. Tully, Hospital Doctors and Their Schemas 
about Appropriate Prescribing, 39 MED. EDUC. 184, 185 (2005). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 186. 
 30. Patel & Kaufman, supra note 23. 
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of experts by filtering out irrelevant information and focusing on 
relevant facts and rules in solving problems.  The prior study of law-
student reasoning was conducted with subjects from Hofstra 
University’s School of Law and focused on three groups of 
students, each with ten subjects: (1) incoming law students; (2) law 
students completing the first semester of their second year; and (3) 
law students nearing graduation.31  The study was conducted using 
“semi-structured” interviews of each of the subjects.32  In each 
interview, the subjects were given a consumer fraud problem 
concerning the sale of a used car and were asked to recite the facts 
of the case and to determine whether the simulated client had a 
viable legal claim and the basis for this answer.  The transcripts of 
these interviews were transcribed and coded for different factors: 
(1) recall of facts; (2) identification of rules and inferences; and 
(3) recital of procedural rules and approaches to take in the case.33  
These data were then analyzed comparing the reasoning skills of 
the three groups.34 
The findings of that study raise some intriguing issues for the 
present research on the effect of clinical legal education on student 
reasoning.  In most respects, third-year subjects in the initial study 
showed only a slight change in reasoning strategy compared to 
second-year subjects.35  In regard to fact recital, for example, third-
year subjects typically showed no improvement over their second-
year counterparts in recalling the relevant propositions in the 
problem.36  And in terms of the relevancy of the propositions 
actually identified, third-year subjects, on average, recalled a mean 
percentage of relevant facts comparable to second-year subjects.37  
These findings, the study suggested, “appear to raise some 
questions about the effectiveness of the final year-and-a-half of law 
school on students’ ability to focus on the relevant facts in a legal 
problem.”38 
In regard to rule identification, third-year subjects, on average, 
identified more rules in comparison with second-year subjects, but 
performed only slightly better than second-year students in terms 
 31. Krieger, supra note 26, at 336. 
 32. Id. at 339; see infra text accompanying notes 79-80. 
 33. Krieger, supra note 26, at 341–42. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 352. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 342–45. 
 38. Id. at 345. 
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of mean percentage of relevant rules identified.39  These findings 
suggest that by the end of their third year, students seem prone to 
indiscriminately generate a large number of rules, many of which 
are irrelevant.  As the study concluded, 
This finding seems to reflect what Patel and her associates 
term “the intermediate effect.”  They have found that 
intermediates on their expertise scale, when confronted 
with a problem in their specialty, often engage in a wide 
scope of information gathering without screening out 
irrelevant information.  They simply process too much 
garbage.  Here, third-year students appear to be 
processing too much garbage.  For example, even though 
the problem explicitly stated, “Your state has no statute 
that applies to this type of situation,” some of the Group 3 
subjects appeared unable to keep themselves from 
identifying possible statutory rules applicable to the 
problem.40 
In the initial study, the most dramatic difference between 
second- and third-year subjects is reflected in the data on drawing 
of inferences.  On average, third-year students drew fewer 
inferences from common experience than first- and second-year 
students who identified approximately the same number of 
inferences.41  This decline in inference drawing may suggest that 
third-year law students are better able to pay closer attention to 
detail than their counterparts.42  It may also indicate, however, that 
as students progress through law school, they become less inclined 
to use common experience in solving legal problems.43  Legal 
education, then, might be thwarting the brainstorming process 
about facts.44 
These findings as to third-year subjects contrast significantly 
from those in the Patel study of final-year medical students.  Unlike 
third-year law students, Patel found that graduating medical 
students performed better than their second-year counterparts in 
several ways.45  For example, graduating medical students were 
 39. Id. at 347. 
 40. Id. at 349. 
 41. Id. at 346. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. (noting the questioning regimen in law school classes and exam 
experiences have ingrained in law students a notion that they should stick to the 
facts in a given problem and not rely on their own experiences). 
 45. Vilma Patel et al., Reasoning Strategies and Use of Biomedical Knowledge by 
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more proficient than second-year students in identifying patterns of 
relationships in problems and developing coherent explanations 
for problems by focusing on relevant facts and doctrine.46  Our 
initial study speculated that the difference between Patel’s and our 
findings could be explained by the fact that all medical students 
have the opportunity to apply the medical knowledge learned in 
earlier years to the actual treatment of patients in clinics.47  Many 
law students do not have these opportunities, and even if they do, 
the experiences are usually much more limited.48 
II. PRESENT STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 
ON LAW STUDENT REASONING 
A. Hypotheses of Study 
Building upon the initial research on development of law-
student reasoning, this study explores the effect, if any, of clinical 
legal education on student reasoning strategy.  While the first study 
indicated that third-year law subjects performed only slightly 
differently from second-year law students in regard to fact recall 
and identification of legal rules, this project was designed to 
explore whether or not clinical legal education had any effect on 
these and other problem-solving processes. 
Proponents of clinical education argue that this pedagogy 
teaches students how to problem solve and deal with unstructured 
situations in which the issues have not been identified in advance.49  
Students who participate in a clinical program as part of their 
course work for the third year of law school obviously do not have 
enough repeated experiences in practice to develop well-organized 
schemas and become expert problem solvers.  But if the 
proponents of clinical education are correct that the pedagogy 
teaches students to problem solve, third-year law students who 
participate in clinics should develop rudimentary schemas for 
approaching problems in practice.  They should be more 
successful, for example, in recalling relevant facts in a case and 
Students, 24 MED. EDUC. 129, 132–35 (1990). 
 46. Id. at 132–33; Vimla Patel et al., Biomedical Knowledge in Explanations of 
Clinical Problems by Medical Students, 22 MED. EDUC. 398, 405 (1988). 
 47. Krieger,  supra note 26, at 353. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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filtering out irrelevant facts than those who have not enrolled in a 
clinic.  They should also be more proficient in identifying relevant 
rules and rejecting irrelevant rules than their nonclinical 
counterparts.  Additionally, in regard to inferences, based on their 
practical experience, students who participate in clinics should be 
able to draw more inferences from facts presented than those who 
do not enroll in a clinic.  Especially in light of the findings in the 
initial study that third-year students, on average, do not outperform 
their second-year counterparts on a number of these factors,50 this 
study attempts to examine whether clinical experience has any 
significant effect on the performance of final-year law students. 
In this study, we also examined two issues which were not 
considered in the first study: (1) the ability of the subjects to 
identify client interests; and (2) their facility in developing a future 
course of action in a case.51  Two of the key aspects of the problem-
solving process in legal practice are the identification of client goals 
and the development of strategies to achieve them.52  If the 
advocates for clinical education are correct, students who have 
participated in a clinic should have begun to develop schemas to 
consider goals and strategy development in a case.  Accordingly, 
they should be more effective in identifying client interests and 
future courses of action than those who have not had a clinical 
experience. 
B. Methodology of Study 
The methodology used in this study was similar to the one 
employed in the previous study of Hofstra law students at different 
stages in law school.53  Like the previous study, this one sought to 
examine the development of reasoning skills as students progress 
in law school.  In this study, at a different law school, we compared 
the skills of law students at the conclusion of their second year with 
graduating students.  The current research also studied the effect 
of clinical legal education on these skills, comparing the reasoning 
of second- and third-year law students who have not participated in 
a live-client clinic with those who have enrolled in such a program. 
 50. See generally Krieger, supra note 26. 
 51. See generally id. 
 52. STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING 
SKILLS 36–37 (3d ed. 2007). 
 53. See Krieger, supra, note 26, at 332. 
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1. Subjects 
The study was conducted with University of Chicago Law 
School students in April 2006.  The research focused on three 
groups: (1) third-year law students with clinical experience at the 
law school’s Mandel Legal Aid Clinic; (2) third-year law students 
without clinical experience; and (3) second-year law students 
without clinical experience.  The number of subjects in each group 
ranged from ten to thirteen.54 
We solicited volunteers for the study by electronically sending 
all second- and third-year law students at the University of Chicago 
Law School a letter requesting volunteers for a study of “second-
year law students who have not taken a clinic course; third-year law 
students who have taken a clinic course for the entire third year 
(Fall, Winter, and Spring Quarters); and third-year students who 
have not taken a clinic.”55  We assured volunteers that the study was 
completely anonymous and offered $25 in compensation to each 
subject.56 
2. Stimulus Material 
The fact pattern used in this study was based on an Illinois 
appellate case, Dobosz v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.57  The 
problem states that the subject has just interviewed a new client, 
Ralph Kuzinsky, and is reviewing her notes in her office.58  Mr. 
 54. Group 1 contained thirteen subjects; Group 2 contained ten subjects; 
Group 3 contained eleven subjects.  This variation in number of subjects was 
caused by the different number of volunteers from each group for the study.  
Given the nature of this study, these slight differences do not affect the validity or 
reliability of the findings. 
 55. A copy of the solicitation memo is available at http://www.studentlegal 
reasoning.info/ucsolitication.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2008).  The University of 
Chicago’s Institutional Review Board found that this study was exempt from its 
rules governing humans as research subjects because it concerned educational 
testing. 
 56. Because we did not have a full complement of subjects for all three 
groups by the dates of the interviews, my research assistants and I also personally 
solicited a few volunteers in the student lounge and the library at the law school 
on the days of the interviews. 
 57. 458 N.E.2d 611 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).  The fact pattern presented to the 
students is contained in Appendix A.  Some of the facts, having no bearing on the 
legal theories, were modified to provide an opportunity for students to explore the 
clients’ interests in the case and strategic options.  Fictional information was given, 
for example, about the client’s marital and economic status and the amount of 
damages. 
 58. See Appendix “A.” 
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Kuzinsky purchased an “All-Risk” homeowner’s insurance policy 
from State Farm Insurance Co. and seeks legal advice because the 
company denied a claim for water damages to his home.  When 
Kuzinsky first called State Farm to inquire about a policy, its agent 
promised to send a brochure showing exactly what the policy 
covered and recommended the “All-Risk” policy because it was the 
“Cadillac of the line” and would cover everything and insure 
against all risks.59 
Mr. Kuzinsky brought a copy of the brochure to the interview.60  
The brochure presents information on three different homeowner 
policies: Basic, Broad, and All-Risk Special.61  For each policy, the 
brochure contains captioned pictures describing examples of 
covered losses.62  For the All-Risk policy, the brochure states that 
the coverage includes the protections of the other two policies 
“plus many others not specifically excluded.”63  One of those 
additional coverages is “Water damage,” with a picture of an open 
window and rain accumulating on the floor.64  In small print at the 
bottom of one page, the brochure provides, “This brochure 
contains only a general description of coverage and is not a 
statement of contract.  All coverages are subject to the exclusions 
and conditions in the policy itself.”65 
After examining the brochure, Kuzinsky called the agent and, 
believing that the All-Risk policy provided the coverage he needed, 
ordered that policy.66  Although the agent claims the company 
mailed a copy of the policy to Kuzinsky, the client denies ever 
receiving it.  He never requested a copy of the policy and renewed 
it the next year.67 
Earlier that year, Kuzinsky said water leaked through the walls 
of his home’s basement, causing the sump pump to stop and 
resulting in accumulating water and damages in the amount of 
 59. Id. 
 60. The brochure included with the fact pattern was an exhibit included in 
the record in the Dobosz case, slightly revised to update information for a 2006 
insurance policy.  See Student Legal Reasoning, http://www.studentlegal 
reasoning.info/ucbrochure.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Appendix “A.” 
 67. Id. 
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$10,820.68  Kuzinsky filed a claim with State Farm for the damage.69  
The company denied the claim, asserting that his policy explicitly 
excluded this type of water damage.  The policy, which Kuzinsky 
brings to the interview, excludes the following types of water 
damage: 
a. flood, surface water, waves, tidal water, overflow of a body of 
water, or spray from any of these, whether or not driven by wind; 
b. water which backs up through sewers or drains, or 
c. natural water below the surface of the ground, including 
water which exerts pressure on, or seeps or leaks through a 
building, sidewalk, driveway, foundation, swimming pool or other 
structure.70 
At the interview, Kuzinsky says that he believes State Farm owes 
him the full amount of the claim, and he wants to know the range 
of his options.71  The fact pattern concludes with a note that 
preliminary research shows no statutory or regulatory provision in 
state or federal law addressing the issues in the case.72   
This case was selected as a problem for several reasons.  First, 
the relatively simple facts of the case provided a fact pattern that 
could be digested by law students in a short period of time, making 
it feasible to study the participants’ understanding and recall of the 
facts.  Second, the basic legal concepts in the case concerned issues 
that most subjects had likely encountered in their law school 
careers.  The Dobosz court framed the issue as a common law 
contract question: whether an advertising brochure constituted 
part of the insurance contract and controlled over inconsistent 
language in the policy itself.73  In considering this issue, the court 
examined whether the insured relied on the brochure and whether 
the brochure created an ambiguity in the contract terms.74  Relying 
on basic contract construction rules, the court held that any 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Dobosz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 458 N.E.2d 611, 613 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1983).  Obviously, the legal issues examined by a court or parties in a case do not 
reflect the universe of possible legal theories which can be identified in regard to a 
particular fact pattern.  In Dobosz, for example, further fact investigation might 
have produced evidence which would support a common law fraud claim.  But an 
appellate opinion issued after briefing by the parties provides a good starting 
point for identifying the basic legal issues in the sample case used in the study. 
 74. Id. at 614. 
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ambiguity in an insurance policy, particularly with provisions 
limiting the insurer’s liability, should be construed in favor of the 
insured.75  As an alternative legal theory, the court framed the issue 
as one of estoppel: an insurer may be estopped from relying on an 
exclusionary clause in the policy when brochures or solicitations 
misrepresent coverage.76  Both of these theories concern issues that 
have been addressed in the first year of law school and are usually 
revisited in upper-level courses, such as Sales, Real Estate 
Transactions, and Remedies.  And by excluding any statutory or 
regulatory issues, no special doctrinal expertise was necessary for 
analysis of the fact pattern. 
Third, while the facts of the case were fairly simple, the 
attached brochure created an opportunity for exploring the 
subjects’ skills in close reading of a document provided by a client.  
Not only did the description in the brochure of the “All-Risk” 
policy raise the issue of inconsistent contract terms, but the small 
print in the brochure warning that all coverages “are subject to the 
exclusions and conditions in the policy itself” suggests a possible 
State Farm defense to Kuzinsky’s reliance on the brochure.  Unlike 
most law school exam questions, this fact pattern required the 
subjects to examine a document provided by a client and allowed 
for a more realistic simulation of the skills required in practice. 
Finally, the fact pattern raised other issues that an attorney 
representing an actual client faces.  For example, gaps and 
inconsistencies such as the mailing of the policy to Kuzinsky, his 
renewal of the policy even though he had not received a copy, or 
the precise basis for the damages, provided rich opportunities for 
identification of areas for fact investigation.  Kuzinsky’s description 
of his background and beliefs also raised questions to explore 
about the client’s interests: that he is a young electrical engineer 
married to a high school teacher; that he purchased the policy 
because he believed it covered everything he needed; and that he 
feels that State Farm owes him the full amount of his claim.  
Kuzinsky’s query at the end of the interview “to know the range of 
his options” also provided the subjects an invitation to brainstorm 
possible courses of action in the case beyond legal research and 
analysis.77 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 615. 
 77. In the prior study of development of legal reasoning skills in law students, 
the fact pattern concluded with the questions, “Based solely on these facts, does 
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3. Interview Methods 
This study was conducted using the same “semi-structured” 
interview methodology used in the previous study.78  In each 
interview, the subjects were asked to verbalize their thoughts as 
they had them.79  To encourage detailed descriptions of the 
reasoning process, the subjects were asked open-ended, probing 
questions throughout the interview.80 
The interviews were conducted and taped by second- and 
third-year law student research assistants who were trained by a 
member of Patel’s team on the use of the semi-structured interview 
process.  In conducting the interviews, the assistants followed a 
script.81  The script informed the participants that the project was a 
short anonymous research study on the development of legal 
reasoning skills in law students.82  The participants were assured 
that the problem was not a test of their abilities, but rather an 
attempt to determine how people think about legal problems.  
Further, the interviewers told the subjects that their responses 
would not be graded or revealed to their professors or anyone else 
but would be tape recorded to ensure accuracy.  Finally, as in the 
previous study, the research assistants told each subject: 
When answering the question please verbalize your 
thoughts as naturally as possible.  Please do not explain or 
rationalize your thoughts but rather communicate them 
in a free flowing manner.  The easiest way to do this is to 
go through your normal thought process but say 
everything aloud as if no one else were in the room.83 
Before the participants were handed the actual fact pattern, 
your client have any viable legal claim for damages?  What is the basis for your 
answer?”  Krieger, supra note 26, at 355.  Reviewing the transcripts of the subjects’ 
responses, we found that a number of subjects, perhaps prompted by the 
questions at the end of the fact pattern, treated the fact pattern as a law school 
examination.  For that reason, we modified the question at the end of the fact 
pattern to more realistically replicate the kind of question asked by a client at the 
end of an initial interview. 
 78. Id. at 339-40. 
 79. Id. 
 80. For a complete description of the methodology and the research used in 
the study, see id. at 339–40. 
 81. A copy of the script is included in the material posted on this study’s 
website. Student Legal Reasoning, http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/ 
ucscript.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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they were given a sample LSAT problem for a test run.  In 
answering this problem, the subjects were encouraged to verbalize 
their thoughts and discouraged from providing explanations for 
their reasoning.  Then the research assistants gave the fact pattern 
to the subjects and told them: 
You just interviewed a new client, Ralph Kuzinsky. This 
memo contains your notes from that interview. You are 
now reviewing your notes alone in your office.  Please 
review this, either aloud or to yourself, and if you are 
thinking of anything as you review these material, please 
verbalize any thoughts you have as you read.  This should 
mirror your normal thought process.  It should be as 
natural as possible.  Remember, just as in the previous 
exercise you only need to report what you are thinking 
without explaining why you think it.  The information on 
the page is all the information available regarding this 
material.84 
After the subjects indicated that they had completely reviewed 
the fact pattern, the research assistants took the problem from 
them and asked them to state the facts of the case.  Then, the 
interviewers asked them for their assessment of the case and the 
basis for their assessments.  Next, the subjects were asked what they 
should tell the client.  And finally, the research assistants asked the 
subjects to identify the next steps to take in the case.  After each of 
these questions, the interviewers probed the subjects’ responses, 
asking them if they had any other responses regarding the matter. 
4. Coding the Data 
After the interviews, the tapes were transcribed.85  These 
transcripts were then analyzed using the same “propositional 
analysis” method used in the previous study.86  This technique 
involved segmenting the responses in each think-aloud interview by 
propositions (either clauses or sentence fragments reflecting a 
single thought).  Two research assistants and I then coded each 
proposition for a number of categories: (1) recital of facts, both 
relevant and irrelevant, set forth in the fact pattern; (2) 
 84. Id. 
 85. Copies of the transcripts with segmented propositions are available at 
http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/uctranscripts.html (last visited Nov. 12, 
2008). 
 86. For a description of the benefits of using the propositional analysis 
method for examining the reasoning process, see Krieger, supra note 26, at 341. 
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identification of rules, both relevant and irrelevant, used in the 
assessment of the case; (3) drawing of inferences from the facts set 
forth in the problem; (4) identification of client interests; and (5) 
the next steps the subjects identified should be taken in the case. 
Prior to coding the transcripts for each category, we developed 
protocols to attempt, as much as possible, to standardize the 
process.87  Then, two research assistants and I reviewed each 
transcript, segmented into propositions, and independently coded 
them.  Any identifying information indicating the subjects’ year in 
law school or clinic participation was kept separate from the 
transcripts or tapes so the coders were unable to determine the 
group to which they belonged.  After all the codings were 
completed, all three of us met and reconciled all discrepancies. 
C. Analysis of Data 
1. Recall of Facts 
As in our study of development of legal skills throughout 
students’ law school careers, we coded the transcriptions for recital 
of facts at the point in the interview when the research assistants 
took the problem from the subjects and asked them to state the 
facts of the case.88  The purpose of this coding was to examine our 
first hypothesis that third-year law students who have participated 
in a clinic should be more proficient in recalling relevant facts in a 
case and filtering out irrelevant facts than those who have not 
enrolled in a clinic. 
To code for factual relevancy, we scored each proposition set 
forth in the problem for its relevancy using the following scale: (1) 
most relevant to legal issues in case or client’s interests; (2) relevant 
to legal issues in case or client’s interests; (3) limited relevancy to 
legal issues in case or client’s interests; and (4) little, if any, 
relevancy to legal issues in case or client’s interests.89  We based our 
 87. The coding protocols used in this study are available at 
http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/ucprotocols.html (last visited Nov. 12, 
2008). 
 88. For related discussion in the previous study, see Krieger, supra note 26, at 
341–42. 
 89. The protocol used for fact recitation coding is posted on the study’s 
website available at http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/ucprotocols.html (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2008).  The scoring system we used was similar to that used in our 
previous research.  Krieger, supra note 26, at 342–43. 
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scoring on the opinion in the Dobosz case.90  We scored the essential 
facts relevant to the two legal theories (contract construction and 
estoppel) and the client’s interests in the case as “1.”  Cumulative 
evidence as to these theories and interests, as well as facts relating 
to possible defenses, were scored as “2.”  We scored every 
background fact and statements establishing evidentiary 
foundation for relevant facts as “3.”  All other statements were 
scored as “4.”  Of the seventy-five propositions in the problem, 
fourteen were scored as having most relevance; six were scored as 
relevant; thirty-six were scored as background or foundation facts; 
and nineteen were scored as having little or no relevance.91 
The summary of the data on the subjects’ recital of facts is set 








Average Number of Facts 
Recalled 
 
Group 1 (3L’s with Clinic)  13.5 (6.4) 
 
Group 2 (3L’s without Clinic)  18.3 (6.2) 
 
Group 3 (2L’s)  15.1 (7.5) 












 90. Dobosz, 458 N.E.2d 611 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983). 
 91. A chart reflecting those codings is available at http://www.studentlegal 
reasoning.info/ucfactcoding.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
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Table 3: Of All Propositions Recalled, Mean Percentage of 







Group 1 (3L’s with Clinic)   38.07% 
 
Group 2 (3L’s without Clinic)  26.78% 
 
Group 3 (2L’s)  32.53% 
 
In regard to recall of facts, Table 1 shows that third-year 
subjects who had not participated in a clinic (Group 2) identified 
the highest average number of total facts (18.3), followed by 
second-year subjects with no clinic experience (Group 3) (15.1), 
followed by third-year subjects with Clinic (Group 1) (13.5).  In 
terms of relevancy of total facts actually recited, however, Table 3 
shows that third-year subjects who had taken a clinic recited the 
highest mean percentage of relevant facts (38.07 percent), followed 
by second-year subjects with no clinical experience (32.53 percent), 
followed by third-year subjects who had not participated in a clinic 
(26.78 percent). 
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These data suggest that while third-year students who had no 
clinical experience recalled more facts on average than their 
clinical counterparts, more of the facts identified by those subjects 
without clinic experience were not relevant to the problem.  
Consistent with the first hypothesis, students with clinical 
experience seem to be more proficient than those without such 
training at filtering out irrelevant facts and focusing on the facts 
that were relevant.  This is an especially significant finding because 
the problem in this study did not directly concern any of the 
subject matters handled by the Mandel Clinic.92  Indeed, some of 
the clinical programs addressed issues in very different areas from 
contract law, such as police accountability and mental health.  
While it seems reasonable that students with a clinical experience 
in a particular area of practice would develop rudimentary schemas 
for handling problems in that subject, these findings suggest that 
they can use these schemas in different areas in which they have 
not practiced, but in which they have domain knowledge such as 
contracts law.  Accordingly, perhaps clinical training encourages 
students to focus on facts relevant to doctrine of which they have 
knowledge. 
The data do indicate, however, that subjects in all three groups 
did not pay close attention to the State Farm brochure attached to 
the problem.  Of the four Most Relevant and Relevant facts 
reflected in the brochure, subjects in all three groups only 
identified one of those propositions: that one of the ten pictures 
describing the coverage of the All-Risk Policy was captioned “Water 
Damage.”93  And that fact was only identified by three subjects in 
Group 1, three in Group 2, and two in Group 3.  With only two 
exceptions, no subject in any of the three groups identified the 
other three Most Relevant and Relevant propositions in the 
brochure: (1)  that the brochure provided that the “All-Risk Special 
Policy adds coverages from the other two policies plus many others 
not specifically excluded; (2) that one of the pictures showing the 
 92. At the time of this study the Mandel Clinic had projects in the following 
areas: Appellate Advocacy, Civil Rights and Police Accountability, Criminal and 
Juvenile Justice, Employment Discrimination, Entrepreneurship, Children's 
Advocacy, Housing Development, and Mental Health.  Five of the Group 1 
subjects participated in the Civil Rights and Police Accountability Clinic, two in the 
Criminal and Juvenile Justice Clinic, four in the Mental Health Clinic, one in the 
Housing Development Clinic, and one in the Entrepreneurship Clinic. 
 93. Student Legal Reasoning, http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/ 
ucfactcoding.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008) 
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coverage of the All-Risk Policy depicted an open window through 
which rain is falling and below which a puddle is formed; and (3) 
the brochure contained a statement, “This brochure contains only 
a general description of coverage and is not a statement of 
contract.  All coverages are subject to exclusions and conditions in 
the policy itself.”94  This third proposition is especially important in 
terms of Kuzinsky’s purported reliance on the brochure and State 
Farm’s possible defense, which in fact was raised in the actual 
case.95  One of the reasons for this lack of attention to the 
brochure’s details could be the subjects’ perceptions that they did 
not have time to review the document thoroughly.  It could also 
mean that none of the subjects, even those on the verge of 
graduation, had been trained well in the skill of close reading of 
actual case documents.  But, it is especially surprising that the third-
year subjects who had participated in a clinic and who undoubtedly 
had the experience of reviewing documents for preparation of 
their cases apparently did not take the time to closely read the 
evidence provided with the problem. 
The tendency of third-year students without clinic to recite on 
average more facts of a problem, a higher percentage of which are 
irrelevant, appears to reflect what Patel calls the “intermediate 
effect.”96  Patel has found that as novices gain more expertise, they 
often engage in a wide scope of information gathering without 
screening out irrelevant facts.  “They simply process too much 
garbage.”97  Only, as they developed expertise, could they better 
distinguish between relevant and irrelevant facts.  The findings in 
this study suggest that without the clinical experience of schema 
formation, third-year students are less likely on average to screen 
out irrelevancies.98 
 94. Id.  One subject in Group 2 identified the picture of the window with the 
puddle beneath it, and a different Group 2 subject, pointed to the language in the 
brochure that it was not a statement of contract. Id. 
 95. Dobosz, 458 N.E.2d at 615–16. 
 96. Krieger, supra note 26, at 349. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Surprisingly, as Table 3 reflects, second-year subjects identified a higher 
mean percentage of relevant propositions than third-year subjects with no clinical 
experience.  As Table 1 demonstrates, they processed less garbage, recalling fewer 
facts than the Group 2 subjects, but, of the facts recalled, a higher mean 
percentage of them were relevant. 
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2. Identification of Rules 
We also coded the transcripts for identification of substantive 
rules.  A rule was defined as any legal standard that the subject took 
into account in assessing the problem.  Reviewing each proposition 
recited by the subjects during any portion of their discussion of the 
case, my research assistants and I identified every rule considered 
by each of the subjects.99  After we reconciled these identifications, 
we scored the rules for relevancy.  A rule was scored as relevant 
only if it concerned one of the theories identified by the Dobosz 
court—breach of contract or estoppel—or one of the elements for 
those theories.100  The purpose of this coding was to test our second 
hypothesis: subjects who had clinical experience should be more 
proficient in identifying relevant rules and rejecting irrelevant rules 
than their nonclinical counterparts.  As with fact recital, students 
who have participated in a clinic should have started to develop 
schemas for handling problems in practice which help them to 







 99. A chart reflecting the rules identified by each subject is available at 
http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/ucrulecoding.html (last visited Nov. 12, 
2008).  We initially distinguished between three categories: (1) “theories”—
explicit identification of particular causes of action such as breach of contract and 
estoppel; (2) “rules”—explicit identification of an element supporting a cause of 
action; and (3) “evidence marshaling”—subject appears to apply a rule by using a 
term such as “argue” or “claim” in discussing evidence.  After coding the data, we 
found it impossible to make any significant findings because of the overlap 
between the three categories, so we combined codings for all of them as a single 
“rules” category. 
 100. This definition is very narrow, and it can be argued that experienced 
lawyers might be able to identify other possible causes of action for Kuzinsky from 
the facts in the problem.  We used the court’s decision for assessing relevancy, 
however, because we needed a standard for examining the proficiency of the 
subjects in identifying relevant rules.  It is reasonable to assume that theories and 
rules identified by the parties in the case and the court deciding the case are 
arguably the most relevant to the particular case.  Our goal here was to examine 
the subjects’ ability to identify rules concerning the most relevant causes of action, 
not possible rules applicable to some less relevant hypothetical claim.  
Accordingly, by scoring a rule as irrelevant, we intended only to note that it was 
not applicable to breach of contract and estoppel theories. 
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Tables 4 to 6 summarize the data on identification of rules. 
 




Mean Number of Rules 
Identified 
 








Group 3 (2L’s) 
 
6.09 (2.8) 










Mean Number of Relevant 
Rules Identified 
 








Group 3 (2L’s) 
 
3.73 (2.4) 
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Relevant Rules Identified 
 












Table 4 shows that third-year subjects without clinical 
experience identified on average the highest number of rules (8.8); 
followed by third-year subjects who had participated in a clinic 
(6.77); followed by second-year subjects (6.09).  In regard to the 
relevancy of the rules identified, Table 5 demonstrates that third-
year subjects who had not participated in a clinic again led the 
pack, identifying on average the most relevant rules (5.90); 
followed by third-year subjects with clinical experience (5.00); 
followed by second-year subjects with no clinical experience (3.73).  
Finally, in regard to the mean percentage of rules identified that 
are relevant, Table 6 shows that 73.86 percent of the rules 
identified by third-year subjects with Clinic were relevant; 67.05 
percent of the rules identified by third-year subjects without Clinic 
were relevant; and 61.19 percent of the second-year subjects 
without Clinic were relevant. 
 
These data indicate that once law students reach third year, 
regardless of whether or not they enroll in a Clinic, they are better 
able to identify rules than second-year students, and the rules they 
identify are, on average, more relevant.  This finding is similar to 
the one in our prior study of law student reasoning in which we 
found that as students progress in law school, they are able to 
identify more rules in relation to a legal problem.101  The data in 
this study suggest, however, that third-year students without clinical 
experience are more likely to explicitly recite rules—both relevant 
and irrelevant—than their clinical counterparts.  But, of all the 
rules identified, the percentage of relevant rules for third-year 
 
 101. Krieger, supra note 26, at 347–49. 
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students who have not participated in a clinic is less than that for 
students with clinical experience.  Perhaps this is another example 
of the “intermediate effect” for third-year students who have not 
enrolled in a clinic: they are more proficient in spotting issues in a 
case than their clinical counterparts but less successful in assessing 
their relevancy.102 
These data call into question the second hypothesis—that 
students with clinical experience should be more proficient in 
identifying relevant rules and rejecting irrelevant rules than their 
nonclinical counterparts.  While third-year students with clinical 
experience identified a higher percentage of relevant rules in 
terms of all rules identified than their nonclinical counterparts, 
third-year students without clinic, on average, identified a larger 
number of relevant rules than those who had participated in a 
clinic. 
There are several possible reasons for these differences. First, 
clinic students, through their casework, may spend less time 
explicitly considering legal rules than those students who have not 
enrolled in a clinic.  They may use the rules in practice but may not 
articulate them.  Second, clinic students may be less concerned 
with legal theories than their non-clinic counterparts.  Proponents 
of clinical education argue that it helps students learn to apply 
legal doctrine in practice.103  Yet, the data raise questions as to 
whether clinics are in fact facilitating the application of legal 
knowledge in problem solving, or instead encouraging students to 
focus on other aspects of practice, such as addressing the client’s 
non-legal interests.  Third, clinic students at client interviews may 
focus more on facts than rules and defer explicit legal analysis until 
after the interview.  Finally, to a lesser extent than third-year 
students with clinical experience, third-year students without clinic 
experience may have considered the problem on a law school exam 
question, in which issue spotting was the aim, rather than a client 
problem to be solved.  Students with a clinic experience may have 
treated the problem as an actual case for which rule identification 
was only one aspect.  Further research would be helpful to explore 
this hypothesis and to assess the effect of clinical education on rule 
application. 
 102. Id. at 349. 
 103. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 82 (suggesting that experiential 
learning helps law students learn how to apply their legal knowledge in 
representation of actual clients). 
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3. Drawing of Inferences 
Our third hypothesis is that students who have participated in 
a clinic should be able to draw more inferences from facts 
presented than those who have not enrolled in a clinic because of 
their practice experience.  In our previous study on law-student 
reasoning, we found a substantial decline in inference drawing in 
third-year subjects as compared with those in their second year.104  
We conjectured that this decrease may have reflected a greater 
attention to detail by the third year in law school, or an inhibition 
fostered by law school classes from assuming any facts not provided 
in a problem.105  For the present study, we sought to examine 
whether or not practice experience in a clinic affected the 
inference-drawing process. 
In coding for inferences, my research assistants and I defined 
an “inference” as the drawing of a conclusion from known facts 
based on premises or assumed to be true.106  If the premise was a 
legal rule, we did not code the proposition as an inference but as a 
rule recital.  We were only looking for inferences drawn from the 
subject’s experiences.  For the coding process, my research 
assistants and I independently examined every proposition in the 
transcripts throughout the interview.  We coded every instance in 
which a subject did not merely recite a fact in the problem but 











 104. Krieger, supra note 26, at 345–46. 
 105. Id. at 346. 
 106. See David A. Binder & Paul Bergman, FACT INVESTIGATION: FROM 
HYPOTHESIS TO PROOF 82 (West Publishing 1984). 
 107. A chart reflecting these codings is available at http://www.studentlegal 
reasoning.info/ucinferencecoding.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).  We also 
coded for reasonableness of the inferences based on independent assessments 
made by my research assistants and me.  After unreasonable inferences were 
removed, the numbers were too small to draw any significant conclusions. 
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Table 7 summarizes the data for inference drawing. 
 




Number of Inferences 
 








Group 3 (2L’s) 
 
2.82 (1.5) 
  *SD in parentheses 
 
As this table shows, third-year students without clinical 
experience drew, on average, the most inferences (3.70), followed 
by third-year clinical subjects (2.85), followed very closely by 
second-year subjects (2.82). 
Apparently, like the third-year students in the prior study, 
students with clinical experience are more likely to stick to the 
facts.108  Contrary to the third hypothesis, students who have 
participated in a clinic are less likely than their nonclinical 
counterparts to draw inferences.109  This phenomenon could be a 
sign of cautiousness by clinical students in handling actual cases.  
Perhaps students with clinical experience wait until further fact 
investigation to begin the inference-drawing process.  But these 
data could also indicate that the clinical experience may stifle the 
fact brainstorming process.  Indeed, in a related finding in regard 
to our examination of identification of next steps to take in the 
case, third-year students without clinical experience were more 
interested in investigating the facts of the case than their clinical 
counterparts.110  Given the assumption of some proponents of 
clinical education that clinics facilitate the development of fact 
investigation skills,111 these two findings are surprising. 
 
 108. Unlike the prior study, however, there was no substantial decline in 
inferences drawn between the second-year and third-year subjects.  While the 
second-year subjects in the present study drew inferences, on average, at the same 
rate as third-year subjects with clinical experience, the combined third-year data 
shows an increase in inference drawing in the third year. 
 109. See supra Table 7. 
 110. See supra Part II.C.5. 
 111. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 614. 
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss1/3
  
2008] CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 387 
 
4. Identification of Client Interests 
Our fourth hypothesis is that students who have enrolled in a 
clinic should be more proficient in identifying client interests than 
those who have not had a clinical experience.  If clinical education 
teaches problem-solving skills, then students in clinical programs 
should have begun to develop schemas to consider client interests 
when considering a new case.  To probe the subjects’ reasoning in 
this area, my research assistants asked the subjects what they should 
tell the client after the interview.112 
To determine the range of codings for subjects’ recitations of 
clients’ interests, we reviewed the Dobosz decision and identified 
every client interest described by the court.113  We then added the 
one interest set forth in the problem that was not included in the 
Court’s decision (“[RK] wants to know the range of his options”).  
Finally, from my own experience in practice, I brainstormed 
possible interests a client may have in this kind of case.114  Possible 
interests included: damages, the full amount of the claim, 
information about the range of options, litigation costs, apology, 
revenge, change in State Farm advertising materials, relief for 
similarly-situated State Farm customers, peace of mind and quick 















 112. Student Legal Reasoning, http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/ 
ucscript.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
 113. Dobosz, 458 N.E.2d 611 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983). 
 114. The protocol for Client Interests codings is available at 
http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/ucprotocols.html (last visited Nov. 12, 
2008). 
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Table 8 summarizes the data for identification of Client 
Interests. 
 




Mean Number of Interests 
Identified 
 








Group 3 (2L’s) 
 
1.64 (1.6) 
 *SD in parentheses 
 
These data show that third-year subjects with clinical 
experience identified, on average, the highest number of different 
interests (1.77), followed by second-year subjects (1.64), followed 
by third-year subjects without Clinic (1.10). 
The differences between the three groups are reflected in the 
following representative excerpts from the transcripts.116  A third-
year student with clinical experience, for example, stated: 
Subject: Ok the total in damages is ten thousand dollars 
um $10,820 which he wants to have repaired. Um I would 
wonder I mean I haven’t had a lot of practical experience 
so I don’t know how quickly legal fees add up but it would 
seem to me that depending on how annoyed he was about 
the situation he would need to do a cost-benefit analysis to 
see what his priorities were. I think I would advise the 
client that um I mean depending on what my analysis of 
the sewers or drains um and whether or not I felt like after 
some research about a sump pump it could in fact be 
excluded from this policy and that we had some colorable 
claim that it could be I would suggest that we write a letter 
you know draft a letter and pursue options outside of trial 
and see if we could get them to agree to pay for some of it 
but then I would see how far he would want to go and how 
much legal fees he would want to incur based on that um 
 
 115. A chart reflecting these codings is available at http://www.studentlegal 
reasoning.info/ucinterestscoding.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
 116. See Student Legal Reasoning, http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/ 
uctranscripts.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
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just based on the cost of litigation. I have a natural bent 
towards mediation but I don’t know that this seems like it 
might be a good I don’t know I would want to talk to the 
client and see what his feelings were on this matter um if 
he was mostly besides wanting his money if he was very 
annoyed about the process and therefore really wanted to 
punish the other side or he just didn’t really mind and 
just wanted some money to pay for it. 
 
Interviewer: Anything else you want to tell the client? 
 
Subject: To read contracts and make sure you get a copy 
before he um especially before he renews them . . .  um 
what else would I want to tell my client.  It doesn’t seem 
like it’s a clear cut case so that’s why I would want to talk 
to him about what his priorities were cause I think that I 
mean without understanding what the law is in the 
jurisdiction that um he might it might be a bit of an uphill 
battle so yea that’s about it. 
 
 In contrast, a third-year subject without clinical experience 
merely identified one interest: “Ralph just wanted to know any 
claims he might have or if he can pursue this any further.” And a 
second-year subject stated, 
I’ll try to get his permission to negotiate a settlement of 
some sort um and try to get a range from him as to what 
would be appropriate in this case if it is the full amount 
like if he would take $9,995 or something right. And then 
I would discuss with him that if that doesn’t work I would 
discuss with him the potential for filing a claim and tell 
him what my fees are whatever they might be.  That is 
where I would start though tell him to fix it up and um if I 
think can call the insurance company and see what they 
have to say about it so. 
 
In regard to the most frequently identified interests, little 
difference existed between the groups.  Subjects from all groups 
noted the damages State Farm owed Kuzinsky and litigation costs.117  
But in terms of range of options, as a group, those subjects with 
 117. Student Legal Reasoning, http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/ 
ucinterestscoding.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
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clinical experience identified more interests than subjects without 
clinical experience: nine interests, compared with six for second-
year subjects and four for third-year subjects who had not 
participated in a clinic.118  Third-year subjects with clinical 
experience were the only ones who identified the interests of relief 
for similarly-situated customers and a quick resolution of the 
claim.119  In contrast, subjects without clinic experience were the 
only subjects who did not identify revenge, pride, need for changes 
in State Farm’s practices and policies, and assessment of what case 
is worth.120  Finally, no subject in any group identified an apology or 
peace of mind as an interest. 
These data appear to support the fourth hypothesis.  Subjects 
who participated in a clinic were more proficient, on average, than 
those without clinical experience in identifying client interests.121  
In fact, in contrast to second-year subjects, third-year subjects with 
no clinical experience were less proficient in identifying client 
interests.122  Comparing these findings with those on rule 
identification, it appears that third-year students without clinic 
experience focused more on issue spotting than problem solving.123  
Perhaps they are at a point in law school where they just wanted to 
give the doctrinal answers and not consider the specific needs of 
the client. 
These data also suggest some surprising findings for third-year 
students with clinical experience.  Although clients of the Mandel 
Clinic do not pay fees, these students, on average, identified 
litigation costs as an interest more often than their nonclinical 
counterparts.124  Perhaps, even without an actual experience with 
charging fees, students who have participated in a clinic are more 
sensitive to issues arising in actual practice, especially the needs of a 
real client.  It is puzzling, however, that no student with clinical 
experience identified an apology or peace of mind as an interest. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See supra Table 8. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 124. Student Legal Reasoning, http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/ 
ucp.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
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5. Identification of Next Steps 
In their interviews, subjects were asked what steps they would 
take next in the case.  Our hypothesis was that subjects who had 
participated in a clinic would identify more of these steps because 
of their experience in practice.  We conjectured that through 
representation of actual clients these subjects should not only be 
focusing on the facts and legal rules in a case, but should be 
considering alternative courses of action to address their client’s 
interests.  We coded identification of next steps by reviewing the 
entire transcript of each subject’s interview and noting all 
references to possible different courses of action: (1) fact 
investigation; (2) legal research; (3) alternative dispute resolution; 
and (4) client counseling.125  We also divided each of these general 
areas into subcategories. 
Table 9 summarizes the data for identification of next steps. 
 




Mean Number of Next Steps 
Identified 
 








Group 3 (2L’s) 
 
6.64 (2.6) 
*SD in parentheses 
 
 These data show that on average, third-year students with 
clinical experience identified the highest number of next steps 
(7.15), followed by second-year students (6.64), followed by third-
year students who had not participated in a clinic (6.10). 
The differences between the responses of the subjects in the 
 
 125. The protocol for coding identification of next steps is available at 
http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/ucprotocols.html (last visited Nov. 12, 
2008).  Under this protocol, we provided that the same proposition in an interview 
could be scored for both client counseling and client interests.  If the subject 
merely recited a client interest, we only scored the proposition for that category.  
But, if the subject recited a possible client interest in regard to his/her further 
discussions with the client, we scored for both client interests and counseling. 
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three groups can be quite stark.126  A subject with clinical 
experience, for example, gave this response to the question about 
the next steps he/she would take: 
My next step like I said would be to do some research, 
some case law research.  Since it doesn’t seem like there’s 
any statutes or regs that are relevant.  To see if there [are] 
any similar insurance cases in our jurisdiction or general 
contract cases in which,  in which one of the parties 
signed the contract and then later claims to not have 
known the terms of the contract.  And, specifically if it’s 
possible to look into whether State Farm has any sort of 
history of issues with this or whatever this agent does.  
Maybe talking to, asking Williams if I can talk to.  Sorry 
asking Ralph if I can talk to you know the friend that 
recommended the agent to him.  So basically researching 
the case law and possibly doing some factual investigation.  
I guess for the sake of preserving the evidence, I would 
want a more formal inspection of the damage and 
assessment of the damage.  Maybe I’ll take pictures of the 
damage in the home before it gets fixed in case we do 
litigate.  Basically I think I need to learn more about the, 
this area of the law and do that through research or 
through talking to colleagues. 
 
In sharp contrast, a third-year subject who had not participated in a 
clinic answered the question, 
 
Um personally I would probably do a little more research 
on the substantive area of the law.  Uh it doesn’t seem like 
it is that complicated of a case as far as what the what the 
law would be and what the right answer would be. Um and 
so it is probably something that could easily be um the 
merits could easily be determined through legal research 
so I would do that and then advise the client as to what my 
findings are. 
 
Interviewer: Anything you want to add at all? 
 
 126. The transcripts for these subjects can be found on the study’s website.  
Student Legal Reasoning, http://www.studentlegalreasoning.info/uctranscripts. 
html (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
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 And a second-year subject gave this response about next steps: 
 
The next step that I would first want a copy of the policy 
and look at that um... I might try to do some research to 
find out how other cases had been resolved um 
depending on the situation. It might be a matter of calling 
the insurance company and sort of I mean just in my own 
experience um from purchasing insurance that 
companies routinely deny things because they don’t want 
to pay the money but if you fight with them a little bit 
sometimes they will capitulate and actually honor their 
insurance policy. So it might be a simple matter of calling 
the insurance company and saying I am the attorney for 
so and so why haven’t you paid this claim and sort of 
getting them to honor their obligation that way… After 
that I mean potentially pursue a case in court if it was 
worthwhile but I mean its really it’s a claim of $10,000 and 
it’s probably a significant amount to Ralph but it is not 
like worth litigating for months and month and months 
and a settlement is much more likely option and a 
resolution if it got to that point. 
The most frequently identified next steps for third-year 
subjects with clinical experience were general legal research and 
research of analogous cases; for third-year subjects without clinic, 
fact investigation and research of analogous cases; and for second-
year subjects, negotiation, counseling, and obtaining additional 
documents.127  Third-year subjects with clinical experience were the 
only subjects to identify a number of next steps: mediation, 
sympathizing with the client, protecting the attorney-client 
privilege, and lobbying for changes in insurance regulations.128  
Their counterparts with no clinic training were the only subjects 
who identified contacting attorneys who handled similar cases, 
speaking with the State Farm agent’s assistant, investigating the 
type of neighborhood in which Kuzinsky lived, and contacting the 
Better Business Bureau. 
These data appear to support the hypothesis that students with 
clinical experience are more proficient in considering the next 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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steps in a case than their nonclinical counterparts.  Clinical 
education apparently trains students to consider more extensively 
the actual process of developing a strategy to resolve conflict.  But 
surprisingly, the most frequently identified next steps of these 
subjects concerned the need for legal research.  Even though these 
subjects identified fewer rules than their nonclinical 
counterparts,129 they focused on legal research as the next step to 
take in the case.  One possible explanation for this finding is that 
these students’ clinical experience has trained them not to rely on 
their own knowledge of legal doctrine but to treat every case as one 
that needs research.  This is not, however, the type of strategic 
reasoning used by experts in problem solving.130 
The data in regard to third-year subjects without clinical 
experience are also surprising.  Consistent with our hypothesis, 
these subjects identified fewer next steps than their clinical 
counterparts.131  Perhaps, as with our findings in regard to rule 
identification,132 these subjects viewed the problem as a law-school 
exam question and did not consider the ramifications of their 
answers for a client they encountered in actual practice.  But these 
were the only subjects who identified several areas for fact 
investigation, including contacting the agent’s assistant and the 
Better Business Bureau.  As with inference drawing, these subjects 
appear to be more focused on fact analysis than on subjects with 
clinical experience.  Accordingly, it is unclear from these data the 
extent to which clinical experience actually trains students to focus 
on fact investigation and analysis. 
D. Preliminary Conclusions on the Effect of Clinical Education on 
Student Problem Solving 
The data collected in this study indicate that at least in some 
respects, the advocates of clinical education are correct in their 
assertions that this pedagogy helps to train students for the 
problem-solving process.  Our research suggests that subjects with 
clinical experience outpaced their nonclinical counterparts in 
identifying client interests and the next steps to take in the case.133  
It appears that a one-year clinical experience educates students to 
 129. See supra Tables 4–6. 
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29. 
 131. See supra Table 9. 
 132. See supra Tables 4–6. 
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 115–23 and 126–31. 
36
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss1/3
  
2008] CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 395 
 
consider the needs of the client and to engage in strategic decision 
making.  Third-year law students without a clinical experience 
seemed to be focused on the traditional law school task of issue 
spotting, to treat the problem as an abstract exercise, and to 
overlook the actual needs of the client. 
In regard to other aspects of the problem-solving process, the 
findings are more mixed.  As discussed previously, expert problem 
solving involves the ability to filter out irrelevant information and 
focus on relevant facts and rules.134  In regard to fact recall, it 
appears that subjects with clinical experience exhibited some of 
this ability.  While third-year subjects with clinical experience 
recalled fewer facts on average than their nonclinical counterparts, 
more of the facts identified by the clinical subjects were relevant to 
the problem.135  Subjects with clinical training, however, paid as 
little attention to the brochure attached to the problem as those 
without clinical experience.  At least from this study, it appears that 
clinical experience has little effect on a student’s ability to focus on 
relevant facts presented in a document provided by a client. 
In one other respect, the findings as to reasoning about facts 
are surprising.  Third-year subjects who had not participated in a 
clinic appeared to focus more on the facts of the case—whether 
relevant or irrelevant.  They also drew more inferences from the 
facts than their clinic counterparts, and, in identifying next steps to 
take, some of these subjects focused on areas of fact investigation 
not considered by subjects with clinical experience.136  These 
findings could indicate that clinics train students to stick to the 
facts and not to jump to conclusions.  But they also could suggest 
that participation in a clinic might not necessarily lead to 
proficiency in brainstorming about facts as part of the problem-
solving process. 
In terms of rule identification, while third-year students with 
clinical experience identified a higher percentage of relevant rules 
in terms of all rules identified, nonclinical third-year subjects, on 
average, identified a larger number of relevant rules than those 
who participated in a clinic.137  It is unclear, therefore, whether 
clinics help students to become more proficient in the process of 
filtering out irrelevant rules and focusing on relevant ones.  Given 
 134. See supra text accompanying notes 27–29. 
 135. See supra Tables 1 & 3. 
 136. See supra Table 7 and text accompanying note 127. 
 137. See supra Tables 5 & 6. 
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the finding that subjects with clinical experience on average 
identified legal research as a next step to take in the case more 
frequently than their non-legal counterparts, it is possible that 
these subjects were using a novice approach to problem solving, 
treating every problem as one requiring legal research. 
Some might argue that this measure for assessing problem-
solving proficiency is wrong because the purpose of clinical 
education is not to train expert legal problem solvers but instead to 
educate new lawyers in problem-solving techniques which may 
eventually lead to expert problem solving.138  Under this 
formulation, it might in fact be beneficial to train students in a 
clinic to research every legal issue which arises in a case.  This 
argument, however, ignores the very benefit touted for clinical 
education.  The value of this pedagogy, its proponents claim, is not 
merely that it teaches helpful techniques for handling problems 
but that it prepares students for problem solving in practice.139  As I 
have argued elsewhere, explicit teaching of problem-solving 
techniques to clinic students does not necessarily prepare students 
for practice and might in the long run actually inhibit the 
development of the type of schemas needed for expert problem 
solving.140  Obviously, in a one-year clinic, students are not going to 
become expert problem solvers.  But if one of the purposes of 
clinical education is to train novice lawyers for problem solving in 
practice, it only makes sense to assess the effect of this pedagogy on 
students’ development of actual expertise, not simply their ability 
to use particular techniques in handling a client’s problem. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Obviously this study of clinical education is only an initial 
attempt to explore the issues of the effect of this pedagogy on 
student problem solving in practice.  But the findings of this study, 
however preliminary, do suggest both benefits and limitations of 
clinical education in training students for such problem solving.  
These findings indicate that in some respects, students with clinical 
experience are more proficient in problem solving in actual 
practice.  Unlike their nonclinical counterparts, they appear to be 
 138. See Mark N. Aaronson & Stefan H. Krieger, Teaching Problem-Solving 
Lawyering: An Exchange of Ideas, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 485, 491 (2005). 
 139. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra, note 2, at 95. 
 140. Aaronson & Krieger, supra note 138, at 499. 
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more adept at exploring client interests and identifying next steps 
to take in a case.  They also seem to be better able to filter out 
irrelevant facts and focus on relevant propositions.  Nonclinical 
students, however, appear to be more proficient at drawing 
inferences and in identifying areas for fact investigation.  Moreover, 
nonclinical students seem to a have a better ability to identify legal 
rules applicable to a problem.  Rather than identifying rules, 
clinical students would rather research the issues. 
The methodology used in this research obviously has 
limitations.  The sample size was small, the study only reflects 
findings at one clinical program, and no attempt was made to 
control for the academic ability of the subjects or the particular 
pedagogies of the faculty members in the different clinical 
programs.  The research, however, was conducted with a 
methodology which has been used extensively in assessing medical 
education.  The subjects attended one of the foremost law schools 
in the country with a nationally-recognized clinic, committed for 
decades to the development of clinical pedagogy.  Accordingly, the 
differences between the abilities of the subjects or the approaches 
of the particular clinical faculty members likely were minimal.  
Moreover, the selection of only students who had participated in a 
clinic for a full year gave us the opportunity to assess the effect on 
student problem solving of an intensive clinical program, rather 
than simply a one-semester course or externship. 
In this context, the findings of this research, while far from 
conclusive, invite additional research to replicate this study and 
expand upon it.  Future research on the relationship between 
experiential education and problem-solving ability should consider 
the effects of: (1) clinical education at another institution; (2) one-
semester clinical programs; (3) simulation courses; (4) first-year 
lawyering courses; (5) externship programs; (6) summer and part-
time employment; (7) different clinical pedagogies;141 and (8) 
 141. Proponents of clinical education as a method for teaching students how 
to problem solve in practice acknowledge that students do not learn this skill 
simply by experience in practice.  See, e.g., STUCKEY, ET AL., supra note 3, at 128 
(citation omitted) (“[L]earning does not result only from experience:  ‘Only 
experience that is reflected upon seriously will yield its measure of learning . . . . 
Our duty as educators is both to provide the experiential opportunity and . . .  a 
framework for regularly analyzing the experience and forming new concepts.’”).  
While the clinical literature is replete on suggested methods for assisting students 
to learn from experience, little empirical research has been conducted to assess 
the most effective means for achieving that goal. 
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student interest in skills courses.142  With hard empirical data, a 
serious exploration can be made of issues raised by the studies such 
as the Carnegie Report and the Best Practices Report.  Such research 
is more helpful than simple reliance on survey data by enthusiasts 
or anecdotes of teachers in the field. 
The Carnegie Report notes in its conclusion that most medical 
schools have an office of medical education and encourages law 
schools to follow suit.143  I join in this call and invite others to start 
engaging in empirical research of legal education, especially 
clinical education.  Only in this way can we begin to determine how 




















 142. While the academic ability of the subjects in all three groups in this study 
likely was approximately the same, their interest in skills courses was not.  While all 
but one of the subjects in Group 1 (clinical students) had also participated in at 
least one other skills course, only one subject in Group 2 (nonclinical student) 
had taken such a course.  These courses were Trial Practice: Strategy and 
Advocacy; Negotiation and Mediation; Pretrial Advocacy; and Entrepreneurship 
and the Law.  Eight of the Group 1 subjects enrolled in more than one skills 
course. This contrast could suggest that the differences between the approaches of 
both groups to problem solving may have reflected to some degree the different 
learning styles or curricular interests of the subjects in each group as much as the 
effect of their clinical experience.  Further research comparing clinical and 
nonclinical subjects with similar course preferences would be helpful. 
 143. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 171. 
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[You just interviewed a new client, Ralph Kuzinsky.  This 
memo contains your notes from that interview.  You are now 
reviewing your notes alone in your office.] 
 
CLIENT INTAKE MEMORANDUM 
 
CLIENT: Ralph Kuzinsky 
ADDRESS: 1251 Ridgewood  
Andover 
DATE OF INTERVIEW: April 27, 2006 
LEGAL PROBLEM: State Farm Insurance Co.’s Refusal to Pay 
Claim on Homeowner Policy 
 
Ralph Kuzinsky (“RK”) is a 35-year old electrical engineer who 
has been employed at Midwest Utilities since 2002.  He lives with 
his wife Sylvia Vondrasek (a high school English teacher) at the 
above address.  They moved to the area for his job at Midwest 
Utilities.  They have no children. 
RK and his wife purchased their home at the above address in 
July, 2004.  Before closing on the house, he contacted State Farm 
Insurance Co. to purchase homeowners’ insurance.  He called a 
State Farm agent, Glen Williams (recommended by a friend) to 
inquire about obtaining homeowners’ insurance.  Williams told RK 
that it would take a long time to explain the policy itself, but 
indicated that he would send RK a brochure which would show 
exactly what the policy covered.  Williams recommended the “All-
Risk” policy and said it was the “Cadillac of the line” and that it 
would cover everything and insure against all risks. 
RK showed me a copy of the attached brochure which he said 
he received from Williams.  RK examined the brochure and, 
believing that the “All-Risk Policy” provided the coverage he 
needed, he called Williams and asked him to issue an “All-Risk 
Policy” for his house. 
RK remembers receiving a transmittal sheet from Williams for 
the insurance in the mail a few weeks later, but denies ever 
receiving a copy of the policy.  For that reason, he never read the 
policy.  RK says he never called Williams to request a copy of the 
policy because he did not think insurance companies typically sent 
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policies to purchasers.  He renewed the coverage in 2005. 
In early March of this year, water leaked through the walls of 
the basement and sump pump pit, causing the sump pump to stop 
and allowing water to accumulate in the basement.  The total of the 
damages was $10,820.  Immediately after the incident, RK called 
Williams.  Williams told him that he had in fact sent RK a copy of 
the policy along with the transmittal letter.  RK submitted a claim 
for the damages caused by the leak, but State Farm sent him a 
letter denying coverage asserting that the policy excluded that type 
of water damage.  At that point, RK called Williams for a copy of 
the policy, and Williams sent a copy to him. 
RK showed me the policy sent to him by Williams.  It excludes 
loss from “Water Damage” which is defined as 
a. flood, surface water, waves, tidal water, overflow of a body of 
water, or spray from any of these, whether or not driven by wind; 
b. water which backs up through sewers or drains, or 
c. natural water below the surface of the ground, including 
water which exerts pressure on, or seeps or leaks through a 
building, sidewalk, driveway, foundation, swimming pool or other 
structure. 
RK believes State Farm owes him the full amount of the claim.  
He wants to know the range of his options. 
[Preliminary research immediately after the interview shows 
that there is no statutory provision in state or federal law or 
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